So why is the idea of a draft even considered? One answer is that our military forces are spread far too thin, engaged in conflicts around the globe that are none of our business. With hundreds of thousands of troops stationed in literally hundreds of foreign nations, we simply don't have enough soldiers to invade and occupy every country labeled a threat or deemed ripe for regime change. Given the choice, many in Congress would rather draft more young bodies than rethink our role as world policeman and bring some of our troops home.

If there had not been a draft to provide unlimited young bodies for the jungles of Vietnam, that war would never have started -- nor, for that matter, would the Korean War. As the world should have learned in 1914 and 1939, the availability of conscript armies is an open invitation to leaders to make war. If Bush could have mustered conscript armies of men and women, he might have taken on Iran and Korea, too -- whatever was required for victory.

Having a large standing army and the potential of replenishing it regularly with conscripts has served as an invitation for policymakers to rush into dubious foreign wars (Vietnam) from which - as in Korea and Europe - U.S. troops are never sent home.

For a long time, I remained ambivalent about whether the U.S. should pull out of Iraq. However foolish the invasion had been, however negligent the post-invasion planning had been, didn't we have a responsibility to stay and make things right again? But at this point, our presence is manifestly making things worse. Ask the Iraqis, who ought to know. In a poll released this week, 78% of Iraqis told researchers that the U.S. military presence is "provoking more conflict than it is preventing"; 71% said they want U.S. troops out within a year; 58% said they think inter-ethnic violence will diminish if the U.S. withdraws; and 61% think that a U.S. withdrawal will improve day-to-day security for average Iraqis. We should listen to them, this time.

More important, though, no one ever asked the Iraqis what they desired. A handful of officials in Washington had a vision and forcibly imposed it on 26 million people half a world away. The goodness of the president's intentions don't matter. No one can, or should, feel comfortable standing by in the face of oppression and murder in other lands. But so-called humanitarian intervention inevitably fails the tests of both morality and practicality. The difficulties of humanitarian intervention have long been evident, but the Iraq imbroglio should put a stake through the doctrine's heart. Sadly, in the end, humanitarian intervention just isn't humanitarian.

Post-election, this issue will be debated in Congress and should provide the occasion for a larger debate on the issue: do we truly need more troops, or do we rather need fewer U.S. commitments to fight in places where no vital interests are imperiled?

There are very good arguments for sending more troops to Iraq and for reducing our reliance on imported oil, but these arguments have not persuaded either the commander in chief or his advisers, who believe that what needs to be accomplished can be done without gas rationing and a military draft.

Our failed efforts in Iraq continue to drain our resources, costing us dearly both in lives lost and dollars spent. And there's no end in sight. No consideration is given for rejecting our obsession with a worldwide military presence, which rarely if ever directly enhances our security.  The notion that Arab/Muslim radicals are motivated to attack us because of our freedoms and prosperity, and not our unwelcome presence in their countries, is dangerous and silly.

The involuntary recall of 3,500 Marines to active duty, required by personnel shortages for the war in Iraq, on top of previous extensions of deployment schedules for active-duty troops and reserves, demands an answer to this question:  Is America headed for a return to the draft, either by that traditional name or in some other form?

To be able to retain soldiers over time, the rule of thumb for active duty units is a 3:1 rotation ratio (meaning three total units are needed to keep one unit deployed). So keeping 138,000 troops in Iraq requires an additional 276,000 for rotation or a total of 414,000 soldiers – which is precariously close to the total size of the active duty Army (about 500,000 troops). Moreover, the U.S. Army has another 64,000 troops deployed elsewhere overseas, which, to be sustained, requires a total of 192,000 troops. So when you do the math, the Army is about 100,000 soldiers shy of being able to keep up the current deployments.